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Abstract
 In some respects, the Eurasian Economic Union is not unique for it reveals 
consistency with other cases of economic integration around the globe. Yet, it is the only 
example that compositionally can be referred to as a partial re-integration, although in 
substance it is a qualitatively new formation in progress. The historical legacy of Soviet 
integration and disintegration affects the contemporary process. The ideological and 
political component of the common Soviet past emerges immediately whenever closer 
cooperation among the post-Soviet economies is being discussed. Even so, the scholarly 
accounts increasingly approach the Eurasian Economic Union as the first integration 
among several post-Soviet economies that is modelled on the European Union. The 
objective of this paper is twofold: to examine the formation of the Eurasian Economic 
Union against the theoretical and historical backgrounds, and to explore the expectations of 
member states associated with this integration.
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Introduction
 The Eurasian Economic Union （EAEU） was launched in 2015. Unlike 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, who have been engaged in various forms of 
post-Soviet integration since the early 1990s, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan had 
to make an uneasy choice weighing the benefits of accession against the costs 
thereof. 
 Albeit for its composition the EAEU can be referred to as a partial 
re-integration, in substance, it is a qualitatively new formation in progress. 
The historical legacy of Soviet integration and disintegration affects the con-
temporary process of Eurasian integration （Lane and Samokhvalov 2015, 
Bassin and Pozo 2017, Laruelle 2019, Kobayashi 2019）. In the process of its 
formation, the Soviet Union eventually embraced nearly all the territories for-
merly dominated by the Russian Empire. Yet, the Soviet style of political and 
socio-economic governance was never fully accepted by many incorporated 
nations. Expectedly, the ideological and political burdens of the past Soviet 
integration emerge immediately whenever closer cooperation among the post-
Soviet economies is being discussed. The early progressions of perestroika 
triggered the so-called parade of sovereignty with the Baltic nations, Georgia 
and Azerbaijan being the first to file for their withdrawals from the Union. 
This contributed to the acceleration of the Soviet Union demise. Conversely, 
some nations were reluctant to leave the Soviet Union1 looking for the ways 
as to how to re-arrange the integration under the tenets of newly gained 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the post-Soviet re-integration was lethargic. To a 
great extent, this can be explained by Russia’s lack of interest （and, no less 
importantly, means） in pursuing a new integration project in the post-Soviet 
realm. In 1992, Russia launched the deepest in the post-Soviet group liberal 
reforms in a shock therapy （big bang） mode and became naturally oriented at 
the convergence with economically advanced EU and West at large （Calder 
2019）. It took Russia longer than a decade and a disappointment with the 
modest results of its pro-Western concentration to start discerning the po-
tential benefits of economic integration with the former Soviet economies. 
1   Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were the last to petition for sovereignty, while Tajikistan was the last to 
abolish the Russian rouble circulation and introduce the national currency in 1995.
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Russia’s inclination towards the post-Soviet integration appears to have been 
strengthening in response to the regress in its cooperation with the EU （and 
other nations, most of all, the US） and other highly relevant institutions 
（such as NATO）. Yet, before Russia has formulated the rationale for the re-
integration, some nations formerly sympathising with or neutral about Russia-
led integration, have grown hostile to such an idea （Ukraine）. Also, the re-
integration has become naturally more complicated, because for over nearly 
two decades the newly independent economies had been restructuring away 
from the formerly interconnected cooperation and production systems. A re-
sult of the dis-integration and subsequent market transitions, the post-Soviet 
economies have become less interrelated. It is for the reasons explained above 
that equating the newly attempted Eurasian integration to à-la Soviet re-
integration is not entirely correct.    
 The motivation for this paper is to examine the member-states incen-
tives for founding and joining the EAEU. Such an interest is underpinned by 
the concern to explore the validity of the still dominating in scholarly work 
assessment that the EAEU is a “Putin’s project” enforced by Russia on the 
member-states against their best economic interests2. This study probes into 
the institutionalisation of Eurasian economic integration, whereas a separate 
work analyses the preliminary effects of economic integration on the member 
states’ trade, investment, labour migration, education, and economic and insti-
tutional convergence （Shadrina 2020）.
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, the study profiles 
the EAEU with the help of principal economic metrics. To place the case of 
the Eurasian integration in the theoretical and historical context, the paper 
2   Shumylo-Tapiola, Olga (2012) The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend or Foe of the EU? Carnegie 
Europe: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Hartwell, Christopher A. (2013) A Eurasian 
(or a Soviet) Union? Consequences of further economic integration in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Business Horizons. 56: 411-420; Mostafa, Golam (2013) The concept of 
‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian policy and its implications. Journal of Eurasian Studies. 4: 160-
170; Popescu, Nicu (2014) Eurasian Union: The real, the imaginary and the likely. Chaillot Papers. 
European Union Institite for Securiy Studies; Svarin, David (2016) The construction of ‘geopolitical 
spaces’ in Russian Foreign Policy Discourse Before and after the Ukraine Crisis. Journal of Eurasian 
Studies. 7: 129-140; Dragneva, Rilka and Kataryna Wolczuk (2017) The Eurasian Economic Union 
Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power. Chatham House. The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
Research Paper. 
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summarises scholarly work on the integration theory and takes a terse glance 
at the origins of Russia’s Eurasianism. A retrospective overview of the process 
of the post-Soviet economic （dis）integration focuses on the member states’ 
motivation for engaging in or abstaining from the Eurasian integration. The 
analysis of the EAEU institutionalisation since the integration’s commence-
ment in 2015 facilitates understanding of the principles of Eurasian suprana-
tionalism. The conclusion summarises the key arguments and findings. 
 
Economic Profile of EAEU   
 Presenting the EAEU’s key characteristics is helpful for grasping the 
scale of economic integration at hand （Table 1）. The EAEU’s land and ener-
gy resources endowment are substantial. However, the EAEU has dispropor-
tionately small （and shrunk by 0.07 % in 2018 vis-à-vis 2010） representation 
in the global population. Also, the EAEU has an insignificant weight in the 
global economy. It makes only a minor （and declined by 0.42 % over the con-
sidered period） contribution to the world’s GDP and holds negligible （and 
contracted by 0.2 % in 2018 versus 2010） share in the world exports. 
 The EAEU-members’ population profiles are diverse in several respects 
（Table 2）. By the parameter of the density of population, the most populous 
in the EAEU Russia is, nonetheless, one of the scarcely populated nations in the 
world. In addition, Russia has a highly uneven distribution of population across 
its territory. Similar characteristics hold for Kazakhstan. Armenia’s population 
is the smallest and, unlike in the rest of the EAEU economies, it has been 
shrinking. To a great extent, the latter is the result of emigration coupled with low 
fertility. To characterise the scale of emigration, in contrast to 3 mn people living 
Table 1: EAEU in the World, Selected Characteristics, 2018, %
Territory Population GDP Export Proved Reserves Electricity 








Oil Gas Coal 
13.63 2.44 2.51 -0.07 2.22 2.64 2.68 1.61 1.81 1.86 7.8 29.7 17.6 4.7
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in Armenia, about 0.7 mn of native Armenians live in France, 1.5 mn reside in 
the US and close to 2 mn live in Russia. Belarus is similar to Armenia in terms of 
population growth trends underlined by a low fertility rate. Among the EAEU 
members, Kyrgyzstan has the fastest growing population, albeit the growth has 
started to slow down. In contrast to the rest of the EAEU members, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan have fertility rates that ensure their populations’ growth. Belarus 
appears to face multiple challenges on the account of the declining population. 
In this regard, Armenia and Russia do only a little better than Belarus. Recently, 
Russia has been proactively promoting immigration launching policies oriented 
at the assimilation of Russian-speaking citizens of the former Soviet republics. 
Although initially such a policy generated migration inflow helping Russia 
maintain its population profile, the trend has reverted lately. Besides the 
persisting negative demographic trends, the latter was due to the shrinking net 
migration under the growing emigration of the Russian population and declining 
immigration, especially from rapidly transforming Uzbekistan （the largest source 
of migrants to Russia）.
 The EAEU members are also very disproportional by the scale of their 
economies （Table 3）. It shall be noted that nominated in USD the value of 
GDP fluctuates tremendously, responding to the swings in the exchange rates 
of the national currencies. Although Russia remains the dominant economy 
in the EAEU, its share in the total GDP has been declining in recent years. 
Similarly, Belarus’ share in the EAEU’s GDP has revealed the signs of decline. 
On the other hand, smaller economies - Armenia and Kyrgyzstan – displayed 
minor rises in their contributions to the EAEU’s GDP. 



















Armenia 2,965.1 1.61 -52.0 -0.35 -0.04 1.60
Belarus 9,475.2 5.15 7.0 0.01 -0.06 1.54
Kazakhstan 18,395.6 10.00 1,234.7 1.40 0.43 2.76
Kyrgyzstan 6,389.5 3.47 612.9 2.04 0.23 3.00
Russia 146,780.7 79.77 3,113.8 0.43 -0.57 1.78
EAEU 184,006.1 100 4,916.4 0.54 n/a 2.14
Source:  author, based on http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/
econstat/Pages/population.aspx
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 The EAEU’s share in the global trade is declining: in 2018, it was under 
2.2 %, down from 2.6 % in 2014 （Table 4）. The decline is largely a result of 
a significant drop in Russia’s （and, partly, Kazakhstan’s） dollar-nominated 
resource-dominated exports. The two countries display a range of effects that 
are typical for hydrocarbon-dependent economies.   
 Thus, the EAEU has an outstanding energy endowment, weakening 
demographic profile （a result of negative dynamics in the most populated 
economies） and decreasing already very modest contributions to the global 
GDP and trade. An important note is that the EAEU’s economic parameters 
have been affected by the inferior performance of its largest economy – 
Russia. According to the forecast of the IMF and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development （EBRD）, in the short term, Russia will see 
the lowest among the EAEU economies GDP growth of just over 1 %. To 
the contrary, smaller economies Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, who have slightly 
improved their positions in output and trade both within the EAEU and 
outside, are projected to grow the fastest at 5-6 % and 4 %, respectively. That is 
Table 3: Share in EAEU’s GDP, %
 
2005 2010 2015 2018 Avg. 2005-2018 Change 2018/ 2014
Armenia 0.57 0.53 0.65 0.65 0.57 0.17
Belarus 3.52 3.26 3.40 3.11 3.15 -0.16
Kazakhstan 6.65 8.49 11.33 9.04 7.88 -0.19
Kyrgyzstan 0.29 0.27 0.41 0.42 0.32 0.11
Russia 88.98 87.44 84.21 86.78 87.51 0.07
Source:  author, based on http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/
econstat/Pages/national.aspx
Table 4: EAEU’s Shares in the World Export, %
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Change 2018/ 2014
Armenia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Belarus 0.08 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.15 -0.01
Kazakhstan 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.23 -0.05
Kyrgyzstan 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
Russia 2.10 2.33 2.38 2.31 2.13 1.62 1.51 1.67 1.75 -0.38
EAEU 2.46 2.78 2.93 2.84 2.61 2.00 1.87 2.08 2.18 -0.43
Source: author, based on https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61013712
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being said, Fig. 1 depicts that despite the negative trends in Russia’s economic 
performance, it is still the leader in the group by the results of economic 
transition with one exception being the enhancement of renewable energy. 
The least successful at economic transition is Kyrgyzstan, who markedly lags 
behind its peers.      
Theory of Integration 
 The integration research embraces numerous accounts belonging to 
an array of disciplines. Characterising this diversity in a very generic way, the 
integration scholarship can be presented as contributed by the students of 
political science and economics. The former includes research in International 
Fig. 1: Assessment of Transition Qualities, 2019; by Country, 2017-2019
Source:  author, based on data https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-
data/data/forecasts-macro-data-transition-indicators.html Note: methodology 
explainers https://2019.tr-ebrd.com/reform/ 
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Relations （IR）, Regional Integration （RI）, Comparative Politics （CP）, 
Public Policy （PP）, as well as interdisciplinary studies （Rosamond 2000）. 
Theories of economic integration advance studies on cooperation （diminished 
discrimination） and integration （abolished discrimination）, distinguish-
ing within the latter between the traditional/ static （old regionalism） and 
dynamic （new regionalism） modes （Hosny 2013）. The theory of economic 
integration emphasises two particular effects associated with integration: trade 
creation – a shift from the consumption of higher-cost domestic products in 
favour of the lower-cost products of the partner country; and trade diversion - 
shift in the source of imports from lower-cost external sources to higher-cost 
partner sources （Balassa 1961）.
 Whereas a decent in any form literature survey on the theory of integra-
tion appears to be impossible within the scope of this work, the systematisa-
tion of the existing research supported by representative works for a specific 
school of thought assists our task of analysing the Eurasian integration （Table 
5）. Such systematisation helps compare the integration scholarship upon two 
criteria: the dependent variable （what the theory explains） and the actor（s）.
 The integration theory has advanced in several dimensions, which dis-
cern different outcomes of integration: cooperation （IR）, integration （RI）, 
governance （CP/ PP）, and economic development （EI）. The disciplines also 
diverge about the principal actor in the process of integration from the format 
which is organised exclusively by the national state to the state and a limited 
circle of stakeholders （interest groups）, or even to a diverse group of actors 
consisting of subnational, national, transnational and supranational players. 
 The IR theories focus on the role of states as the major actors of inter-
national politics acting for the sake of protecting their interests. Yet, the IR 
theories differ significantly in describing the nature of international structure 
and the properties of states, which make cooperation either difficult or prob-
able or even desirable. In turn, the RI theories present non-state centric neo-
functionalism tradition and the state-centric intergovernmentalism tradition. 
Both assume that integration is driven by economic interests, operate by the 
categories of low and high politics to substantiate that it is easier to integrate 
low politics （economic and welfare policies） than high politics （foreign policy 
and security） and emphasise the role of the interest groups. Among sev-
eral differences between these traditions is such that neo-functionalism sees 
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Table 5: Theories, Dependent Variables and Influence of Actors
Theories Dependent Variable Main Actors
International Relations（IR）Theories 
1. neorealism（Grieco 1995, Waltz 1979） 
2. neoliberal institutionalism（Keohane 1984） 
3. constructivism（Wendt 1999） 
cooperation 
1.  voluntary policy adjustment to 
achieve beneficial outcomes 
2.  mutual adjustment of policies, 
policy coordination
3.  reciprocal interaction; state 
interests are endogenous and 
changeable in interaction
states
Regional Integration （RI） Theories 
I. state-centric 
1. federalism（Bóka 2006）  
2. intergovernmentalism（Hoffmann 1964）  
3. domestic politics, two-level game（Putnam 1988）
4.  liberal intergovernmentalism（Moravcsik 1991, 1993）
II. non-state-centric 
1.  neofunctionalism（Haas & Schmitter 1964, Haas 
1968）functionalism（Mitrany 1943）  
2. elite-bargain（Sandholtz & Zysman 1989） 
3.  transactionalism（Deutsch 1957, Sweet & Sandholtz 
1998）
integration
I.  in times of threat, the process of 
integration and federalisation 
advances; policy-coordination 
between states to manage inter-
dependence; involves intergov-
ernmental bargaining 
II . process of new political com-
munity formation/ new actor 
formation, formation of security/ 
political community 
I.  states, interest groups in domes-
tic low politics （economic and 
social agenda） 
II . flexible task-oriented inter-
national, supranational entities 
and interest groups （national, 
transnational） （spillover, spill-
around, buildup, retrench, 
middle-about, spill-back and 
encapsulate strategies） 
Comparative Politics （CP）/ Public Policy （PP） 
Theories 
I.  pluralist: multi-level governance, MLG（Marks 1996）, 
policy-network （George & Bache 2001）, collective 
governance （Wallace 2005）
II . institutionalism – old （Stein 1981）, new （Pollack 
2005）: rational （Hall and Taylor 1996）, historical 
（Bulmer 1998）, sociological （Risse 2004） 
governance and policymaking 
I. governance 
II . policymaking as binding decision 
making in the public sphere 
I.  states, supranational organs 
and interest groups
II . institutions: formal, informal, 
norms, values, beliefs, culture 
and actors （states, supranational 
entities, interest groups） 
Multidimensional Approach  integration and governance 
defined upon 3 dimensions:
1. institutional development 
2. enlargement 
3. socio-economic policy-
    cooperation 
1.  states （functionality, efficiency 
and power） 
2.  states （geopolitical interest） 
3.  states, supranational bodies, 
interest groups （domestic 
problem-solving） 
Economic Integration （EI） Theories
1. market integration models （Viner 1950, Balassa 1961）
2. development integration models （Robson 1980）
3.  industrial planning as redistributive/ corrective mecha-
nism （Myrdal 1957） 
economic development 
1.  free exchange area, customs 
union, common market, econom-
ic union, economic and monetary 
union
2.  economic development driven 
by trade/ investment creation 
and trade/ investment diversion
3.  polarisation effect （economic 
development tends to concentrate 
in more developed member 
economies） 
states, supranational bodies, in-
terest groups 
  Source: author, based on Rosamond （2000）, Hosny （2013） and other research as cited.
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integration as a society-based process to form a political community, while in-
tergovernmentalism defines integration as policy coordination between states 
in different areas. The CP/ PP theories argue that integration is no longer an 
international organisation, but a political system in which policy outcomes are 
formed not only by the states but increasingly by other actors and institutions; 
the decision-making is made not only by intergovernmental but also by inter-
institutional bargaining. The pluralist theories highlight the multi-level nature 
of the political system in which the decision-making authority is shared by 
the governments across multiple levels and among various （subnational, na-
tional and supranational） actors. Institutionalism holds that it is impossible to 
understand the strategies and interactions of actors without taking into con-
sideration the role of institutions, therefore the theory focuses on institutions 
that structure the actors’ behaviour and political outcomes. Different schools 
within new institutionalism converge that institutions matter for policy out-
comes because they channel, constrain and shape actors’ behaviour. 
 The scholarship of economic integration, which draws heavily on the 
history of European economic integration, makes it clear: economic integra-
tion cannot succeed without political support from the founding nations. An 
individual’s political will and visionary of the common future have played a 
distinguished role at the outset of the European integration （Baldwin and 
Wyplosz 2015, Richardson and Mazey 2015）. On this, a seminal Balassa’s 
work reads: “Political motives may prompt the first step in economic integra-
tion, but economic integration also reacts on the political sphere; similarly, if 
the initial motives are economic, the need for political unity arise as a later 
stage” （1961: 7）. Furthermore, on a case relevant to our study Balassa observes 
that “... underdeveloped countries need more state interference in economic 
affairs than do advanced economies, since, in the former, the market incentives 
are often not conducive to development” （1961: 10）.  
Eurasianism 
 The Russian historical traditions of Eurasianism are originating in the 
philosophical writings of Slavophiles at the beginning of the XIX century. 
The founders of the Slavophilism, Mikhail Pogodin, Aleksey Khomyakov, 
Ivan Kireevsky, Konstantin Aksakov and Yuri Samarin, formulated the 
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fundamental principles of the Slavophile theory of history contributing to the 
development of Pan-Slavism （Leatherbarrow and Offord 2010）. The tradi-
tions of classical Eurasianism were formed after the 1917 October Revolution 
by the Russian émigré community. The circle of Eurasianism thinkers was 
diverse in terms of professional occupations, personal religious beliefs and 
political views, but they were genuinely debating the future of Russia seeing 
it in the context of the Eurasian continent. The most outstanding leaders of 
classical Eurasianism were Nikolai Trubetskoy, Vladimir Vernadsky, Pyotr 
Suvchinsky, Georgy Florovsky and Pyotr Savitsky. Their collective volume 
titled “Exodus to the East” published in Sofia in 1921, albeit revealed the in-
fluence of the Slavophile movement presented a broader view on the Russian 
identity, which included Slavs and non-Slavs. The most renown （even if 
criticised by academics for lacking robust methodology） Soviet Eurasianist, 
Lev Gumilev developed the concept of Russian-Eurasian civilisation empha-
sising the idea that the Russian etnos originated out of the symbiotic interac-
tion with the Turkic people （Bassin and Pozo 2017）. The post-Soviet neo-
Eurasianism is most immediately associated with Alexander Dugin （Laruelle 
2019）. Some characterise contemporary Eurasianism as pragmatic and 
contrasting the concept of federalism in integration theory.3 There are several 
approaches within modern Eurasianism. The first is coined “holding-together 
integration” to mean that the Eurasian integration “is regional integration 
initiated by a group of countries that until recently were part of a unitary 
state or a colonial empire and maintain a high level of economic, political 
and cultural ties” （Libman and Vinokurov 2012）. The second approach, 
called cooperative hegemony, “is a type of regional order within which soft 
control is exercised through cooperation agreements based on a long-term 
strategy”, which can also be understood as a binding contract between the 
regional centre and the periphery. The third approach explains Eurasian in-
tegration upon liberal intergovernmentalism （Hoffmann 1966, Milward et 
al. 1994; Moravcsik 1998, 1999）, considering supranational institutions to be 
3   Hereinafter on the types of pragmatic Eurasianism see: Kofner, Yuri (2019) Pragmatic Eurasianism. 
Four approaches for better understanding the Eurasian Economic Union, March 15, http://
neweasterneurope.eu/2019/03/15/pragmatic-eurasianism-four-approaches-for-better-understanding-
the-eurasian-economic-union%EF%BB%BF/, accessed on May 30, 2019.
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of limited importance in the integration process and emphasising instead the 
role of national governments as the key actors in the process of integration. 
The liberal intergovernmentalists argue that the integration process involves 
bargaining, package deals and side payments. Finally, there is a concept of 
“geoeconomic determinism” underpinned by the theories of geostrategists 
Mackinder and Spykman, and influenced by Brzezinski,4 but also incorporat-
ing the ideas of Russian classical Eurasianism. 
Post-Soviet Economic （Dis） Integration 
 Institutionally, the EAEU is linked to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States （CIS）, which for long has been a nominal rather than 
practically functioning project of the post-Soviet integration. The CIS was 
initiated by Belarus, Russia and Ukraine in December 1991and soon joined 
by other former socialist republics except for the Baltic states, who resolutely 
have chosen not to participate in it. Georgia accessed to the CIS in 1993 but 
withdrew in 2008 following the Russo-Georgian War. Also, Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan have never ratified their membership.5 In the aftermath of the 
Crimean crisis, an associate member Ukraine abolished its participation in the 
CIS statutory bodies on May 19, 2018. 
 In the 1990s, most of the post-Soviet economies, including Russia, were 
genuinely inspired by the newly opened opportunities for closer cooperation 
with the EU （Diesen 2018）. However, a great divergence in the CIS’ atti-
tudes towards the EU has been revealed in the early 2010s （Table 6, Box 1）. 
Initially, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were not squarely consistent in their 
choices between the post-Soviet integration and the EU-oriented cooperation 
4   The spatial-functional structure of the world with a significant role designated to Central Asia was 
initially presented by a British geographer and geopolitician Halford J. Mackinder in his speech 
The Geographical Pivot of History (1904) at the Royal Geographical Society. Later, an American 
political scientist Nicholas Spykman also emphasised the importance of Eurasia. The early post-
Soviet studies of Eurasia were largely influenced by an American geostrategist and former National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the author of The Grand Chessboard (1997).
5   In 2005, Turkmenistan applied for and was given a status of an associate member. In the aftermath 
of the Georgian War of 2008, Georgia nullified its membership in the CIS. Following the Crimean 
crisis, Ukraine also terminated its connection with the CIS.
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（Menon & Rumer 2015, Charap & Colton 2017, Ademmer 2017）. In the 
perception of many, the post-Soviet integration was proactively promoted 
by Russia. In reality, it was Kazakhstan who lobbied steadily for the integra-
tion initiatives among the former socialist economies （Vinokurov & Libman 
2012ab）. The Ukrainian political and economic elites were vacillating between 
the two choices especially dramatically （Leukavets 2019）.
 Thus, the post-Soviet integration undertakings were frequently initi-
ated by and implemented among Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The three 
launched the Customs Union in 1993. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined 
the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space in 1999. The Eurasian 
Economic Community （EurAsEC）, uniting five respective economies, was 
launched in 2000. In 2003, the Single Economic Space （SES） was agreed 
upon by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. Participation in the SES 
became Ukraine’s final official act towards the institutionalised integration 
with the CIS members. 
 The enlargement of the EU to the East in 2004 was one of the catalysts 
of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution which revealed the depth of the pro-
Western vis-à-vis pro-Russian divide in the country. The economic interests 
and energy infrastructure have been keeping Ukraine tightly bound to Russia. 
Meanwhile, assisted by exceptionally favourable oil prices throughout the 
early 2010s, Russia has re-emerged economically. This has made Russia grow 
increasingly assertive in political affairs. Whereas the established in the 1990s 
sundry dialogue formats between Russia and the EU, US and NATO have 
started to shrink, the inclination of the post-Soviet countries towards the EU 
has been gradually solidifying. The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 has ampli-
fied concerns over Russia’s actual intentions in the so-called near abroad.6 
Subsequent Georgia’s siding with the EU with the expectations then still 
high for its accession to both the EU and NATO, influenced public sentiment 
in Ukraine. The Euromaidan of November 2013–February 2014 finalised 
Ukraine’s pro-European choice and departure from the post-Soviet setting 
（Ademmer 2017）.
6   Russia’s term for the former Soviet republics. 
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Box 1: Frameworks for the EU–Post-Soviet Countries Cooperation
　　Since 2004, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine were embraced 
by the European Neighbourhood Policy （ENP）,7 which seeks to enhance the ties between the EU 
member states and the East and South European countries. The Eastern Partnership （EaP）8 ini-
tiative was launched in 2009 to provide an inclusive framework for cooperation between the EU 
member states and the above European countries on: （1） economic development and market 
opportunities; （2） strengthening institutions and good governance; （3） connectivity, energy ef-
ficiency, environment and climate change; and （4） mobility and people-to-people contacts. The 
EaP emphasises that each country freely chooses the scope and scale of relations with the EU.9 
Under the framework of EaP, the EU and Armenia concluded the Comprehensive and Enhanced 
7   European Neighbourhood Policy, https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-
policy-enp_en, accessed May 12, 2019.
8   Eastern Partnership, https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership_en, accessed 
May 12, 2019.
9   https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35712/myths-about-eastern-partnership-
factsheet_en, accessed May 12, 2019.
Table 6: Frameworks for the EU and Post-Soviet Countries Cooperation
Country Cooperation Frameworks ENP （2004）  EaP 
（2009）








Georgia 1999 01.09.2014 27.06.2014/ 
01.07.2016
* March 2017
Moldova 1998 01.09.2014 27.06.2014/ 
01.07.2016
* March 2014





Belarus 1995 - 1997 *






Note: for the acronyms and explanations see Box 1.
Source: author.
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Partnership Agreement （CEPA）10 in 2017. The CEPA covers wide range cooperation in economic, 
trade and political areas, and sectoral policies. Among other areas, it covers legal cooperation, the 
rule of law, combating money laundering and terrorist financing, and fighting organised crime 
and corruption. The CEPA is designed to bring Armenian law gradually closer to the EU acquis. 
However, it does not target at establishing an association between the EU and Armenia.
　　Agreement Establishing an Association （AA）11 is a treaty between the EU member states and 
a non-EU country that creates a broad framework for co-operation between them. Areas fre-
quently covered by such agreements include the development of political, trade, social, cultural 
and security links. According to the European External Action Service, for an agreement to be 
classified as an AA, it must meet several criteria: （1） the legal basis for their conclusion is Article 
217 TFEU （former Art. 310 and Art. 238 TEC）; （2） intention to establish close economic and 
political cooperation （more than simple cooperation）; （3） creation of management bodies com-
petent to take decisions that bind the contracting parties; （4） offering Most Favoured Nation 
treatment; （5） providing for a privileged relationship between the EC and its partner; （6） since 
1995 the clause on the respect of human rights and democratic principles is systematically in-
cluded and constitutes an essential element of the agreement; and （7） in a large number of cases, 
the association agreement replaces a cooperation agreement thereby intensifying the relations 
between the partners. The AAs are concluded with the countries which satisfy at least one of the 
criteria: have a special historical bond with EU member states （mainly former colonies of the EU 
members states）; members of the European Free Trade Area （EFTA）; prospective members of 
the EU. In the 1990s, the majority of post-Soviet economies have concluded the Partnership and 
Cooperatio Agreement （PCA）12 with the EU. e PCA is a legally binding agreement between 
the EU and third countries serving the purpose of assisting these countries in their democratic 
and economic development. A PCA is typically effective for ten years, after which they are 
automatically extended each year provided no objections are raised. While ratication of the 
EU – Belarus PCA was suspended in 1997 over the EU’s concern about Belarus increasingly 
nondemocratic development and the EU - Russia PCA was suspended in 2014 over Russia’s 
role in the Crimean crisis, Kazakhstan concluded the Enhanced PCA13 with the EU in 2015 
10  Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage/36141/new-agreement-signed-between-european-union-and-armenia-
set-bring-tangible-benefits-citizens_en, accessed May 12, 2019.
11  Association Agreement, https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vh7dosdm4dzj, 
accessed May 12, 2019.
12  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/
vh7gkuhng0wh, accessed May 12, 2019.
13  Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/18499/enhanced-partnership-and-
cooperation-agreement-between-european-union-and-republic-kazakhstan_en, accessed May 12, 2019.
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and is discussing its accession to the ENP, and Armenia concluded an Updated PCA in 2018. 
The countries that voiced their interest in closer association with the EU ̶ Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine ̶ have replaced their PCA with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
（DCFTA）.14 The DCFTAs allow the three countries to access to the European Single Market 
in selected sectors and grant the EU investors in those sectors the same regulatory environment 
in the associated country as in the EU. 
Onset of Eurasian Integration  
 The well-known historical fact is that the idea of  creating the Eurasian 
Union was voiced by the then president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev 
in March 1994 during his speech at the Moscow State University. Not having 
been dismissed, the initiative nonetheless did not receive considerable inter-
est of the nations who it was directed to, most of all Russia. While at the early 
stage of independence, having few international connections, Kazakhstan was 
interested to maintain strong economic and security links with Russia, the lat-
ter’s ultimate priority was towards forging closer economic ties with the EU 
with the expectations going as far as establishing free-trade zone, greater co-
operation in the industrial sector, a more homogenous educational space and 
visa-free travel, among other things. In the following years, Kazakhstan has 
announced and successfully introduced the multi-vectorial foreign policy to 
fulfil its ambitions to develop balanced relations with Russia, China, EU, USA, 
Japan and other nations （Golam 2013）. Pursuing the very same vision in its 
own foreign policy, Russia was, nonetheless, observing the increasing multi-
vectorial orientation of the former Soviet countries with growing anxiety. The 
recurring swings of the sequential Ukrainian governments back and forth 
between the post-Soviet integration and the association with the EU became 
a point of deep concern to the Russian government. Having eventually turned 
less optimistic about its own prospects for genuine integration with the EU, in 
14  Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine/, with Georgia http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/countries/georgia/, with Moldova http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/moldova/, accessed May 12, 2019.
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2011 Russia stepped forward with the idea of United Eurasia.15 Rejecting the 
notion that the formation of a new union among the post-Soviet states is an 
attempt to revive the Soviet Union, then prime-minister Vladimir Putin sug-
gested that a “powerful supranational association” will not “stand in opposi-
tion to anyone,” rather the stretching from “the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific 
Ocean” project will enable cooperation throughout Greater Europe. The latter 
echoed the Gorbachevian vision of “Lisbon to Vladivostok.” At this stage, 
Russia was envisioning the establishment of an FTA between the EU and the 
emerging Eurasian integration. In 2011, the heads of Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia explicitly demonstrated their coordinated support of the Eurasian inte-
gration.16 Meanwhile, as the divisions between Russia and the EU grew wider 
on a range of topics in one or another way linked to the EU’s EaP and the 
NATO’s potential expansion into Eastern Europe （Caiser and DeBerdeleben 
2018）, Russia adopted a more pragmatic approach and announced a Greater 
Eurasia vision in 2016.17 Notwithstanding its relatively small scale, the EAEU 
emerged as a part of Russia’s newly adopted masterplan of Greater Eurasia 
embracing a broad range of actors such as China, Central Asian countries, 
India, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia 
and others. Apparently, the fact that geo-economic components of Russia’s 
Greater Eurasia conception overlap with China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
（BRI） add attractiveness to the EAEU in the eyes of Russia （Diesen 2018）. 
Other EAEU member-states, especially small-scale economies in Central 
Asia, seem also favour such double engagement for its embedded leveraging 
effects against the economic powerhouse China.
15  Putin, Vladimir (2011) Novyi integratsionnyi proekt dlia Evrazii – budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsia 
segodnia, Izvestiia,October 3.
16  Putin, Vladimir, Novyi integratsionnayi proekt Yevrazii – budushchee, kotoroe rojdaetsya segodnya. 
Izvestiya. October 3, 2011. http://www.izvestia.ru/news/502761, accessed January 2, 2018; Lukashenko, 
Aleksandr, O sudjbakh nashei integratsii. Izvestiya. October 17, 2011, http://www.izvestia.ru/
news/504081, accessed January 2, 2018; Nazarbayev, Nursultan, Yevraziiskii soyuz: ot idei k istorii 
budushchego. Izvestiya. 25 October 2011, http://www.izvestia.ru/news/504908, accessed January 2, 2018. 
17  Toward the Great Ocean – 5: From the Turn to the East to Greater Eurasia, Valdai Discussion 
Club, September 2017.
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Institutionalisation and Evolution of EAEU  
 The EAEU is being increasingly perceived as a new international actor 
modelled after the EU （Dragneva and Wolczuk 2017）. After the Eurasian 
Customs Union （CU） was commenced, the supranational institutions of 
Eurasian integration have started to come in place （Table 7） （Dragneva & 
Wolczuk 2013）. The CU addressed the problems of codification of a contra-
dictory and fragmented net of bilateral agreements into a unified legal regime. 
The decisions of the Eurasian Economic Commission and other bodies were 
given binding legal status （Box 2）. A dispute resolution mechanism was creat-
ed in 2010, which made it possible for private businesses to appeal against the 
actions of their counterparts, as well as decisions taken by CU bodies. In 2011, 
the legal framework of the CU was supplemented with the provisions con-
cerning Russia’s accession to the WTO and by the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the CU in the Multilateral System, which legally obliged the international 
agreement signed by the CU to comply with the WTO rules （Dragneva and 
Wolczuk 2012）. This led to the creation of the EAEU envisioning the free 
flow of goods, services, labour and capital among its three members̶Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia̶from January 2015.18 Following very tense debates 
about the nation’s choice between the EU and Eurasian integration, Armenia 
joined the EAEU to become the fourth member in 2015. Having passed 
through a different format of debates̶membership in the EAEU versus in-
dependence̶Kyrgyzstan eventually accessed the EAEU as the fifth member 
in August 2015 （Kirkham 2016）. For both countries, security considerations 
（especially for Armenia in her longstanding tensions with Azerbaijan and 
Turkey in a stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh）, prospects for the subsidised 
energy imports, larger opportunities for agricultural and processed food ex-
ports （Armenia had very pronounced concern about its famed speciality of 
the Soviet-era – cognac production）, anticipation of liberalised access to the 
EAEU labour market （as of 2018, Armenia’s remittances from Russia account 
for 16 % of GDP, Kyrgyzstan’s – almost 33 %） and prospects for inflowing 
18  Declaration on Eurasian Economic Integration, http://www.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1091, 
Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union, https://www.docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0043610/
itia_05062014, principal documents on Eurasian economic integration, http://www.eec.eaeunion.
org/ru/nae/news/Pages/22-03-2016-inf.aspx, accessed May 30, 2019.
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investment and affordable loans were the key factors influencing these coun-
tries’ accession decisions （Yeliseyeu 2019）. 
Table 7: The EAEU’s Timeline  
2000 Eurasian Economic Community （EurAsEC）: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
2010 Eurasian Customs Union: Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
coordination of macroeconomic policies 
2011 CIS FTA: eight CIS countries, including Ukraine and Moldova
2012 Eurasian Economic Space 
17 agreements on common economic spaces and common markets
Eurasian Economic Commission （EEC）
2013 coordination of agricultural policies 
2014 the Treaty on the Establishment of the EAEU （Treaty） signed on May 29
2015 the Treaty entries into force 
common service market, common labour market 
Court of the Eurasian Economic Union
Armenia accesses to the EAEU on January 2
Kyrgyzstan accesses to the EAEU on August 12
FTA with Viet Nam on May 29
coordinated policies for labour and immigration, intellectual property, measurements and technical 
standards, phytosanitary and animal quarantine, consumer rights protection  
2016 Eurasian Common Accounting Services Market
Eurasian Common Exchange Stock 
2017 Eurasian Common Pharmaceutical Market 
Eurasian Common Medical Products Market 
2018 the Common EAEU’s Customs Code 
harmonisation of administrative and criminal laws 
The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EAEU and China 
preliminary agreement towards FTA with Iran （May）
2019 EAEU’s Common Electricity Market 
FTA with Singapore on October 1
FTA with Serbia on October 25 
FTA with Iran effective October 27
2020 EAEU’s common excise on alcohol and tobacco products 
2023 Eurasian Currency Union 
2025 Eurasian Common Transport Services Market
Eurasian Common Financial Market 
EAEU’s Financial Regulator 
Eurasian Common Gas Market
Eurasian Common Oil and Oil Products Market 
Source:  author, based on http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/Pages/library.aspx, http://www.
eec.eaeunion.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/14-10-2015-inf.aspx, http://www.eaeunion.org/
presentation/, accessed May 23, 2019.
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 The EAEU is underpinned by institutional architecture, wherein com-
mon regulatory and judicial bodies are given prominence. These include 
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the Eurasian Intergovernmental 
Council, the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union （based in Minsk） and 
the Eurasian Economic Commission （EEC） as a permanent regulator of the 
integration process （based in Moscow）. 
 The EAEU’s founding documents declare: respect for the principles of 
international law; respect for the political systems of member-states; mutu-
ally beneficial cooperation, equality and respect of the national interests of the 
member-states; adherence to the principles of market economy and fair compe-
tition; and functioning of the Customs Union without exceptions and restric-
tions after the end of transition periods （Treaty, Art. 3）. The main objectives of 
the EAEU are defined as follows: creating conditions for sustainable economic 
development for the sake of enhanced living standards of people; establishing 
common markets for goods, services, capital and labour force; and enhanced 
comprehensive modernization, cooperation and international competitiveness 
of economies in the global economy （Treaty, Art. 4）.
Box 2: The EAEU’s Institutions 
SUPREME EURASIAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL
（representation level: heads of state of member states）
（convenes at least once a year）
（ mode of decision-making: consensus, decisions are 
binding）
powers:
• considers fundamental issues of the Union’s activities
• determines strategy for further integration 
• makes decisions aimed at realizing the EAEU goals
• appoints Chairman, judges of the EAEU Court
• approves the EAEU budget  
• determines size of contribution of member states 
•  decides procedures for admission of new members 
and termination of membership, granting or annul-
ment  of observer status or status of a candidate state 
• approves international cooperation procedure
• makes decisions on negotiations with third parties
EURASIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION
（representation level: heads of the member-states governments）
（convenes at least twice a year）
COURT OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION
(permanently functioning)
powers: 
•  ensures uniform application of the EAEU Treaty 
and other Union treaties by the Member-States and 
EAEU bodies
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（mode of decision-making: consensus, decisions are binding）
powers:
•  ensures the implementation and control over the implementation 
of the EAEU Treaty, international treaties within the Union and 
decisions of the Supreme Council
COUNCIL OF THE EURASIAN COMMISSION 
（representation level: deputy heads of government） 
（mode of decision-making: consensus, decisions are binding） 
powers: 
• delivers general regulation of integration processes 
• develops proposals for enhancement of integration 
•  provides general leadership of Commission’s activities, including 
employment matters 
•  makes most important decisions in areas of tariff and customs 
regulation and other areas of delegated authority 
• can repeal the Board’s decisions 
BOARD OF THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION
（representation level: two ministers nominated by the member-states） 
（ mode of decision-making: two-thirds majority or consensus, deci-
sions are binding） 
powers: 
• monitors the implementation of superior bodies’ decisions  
• makes routine decisions in areas of tariff and customs regulation 
• assists member states with settlement of disputes 
• provides technical support for the EAEU other bodies 
• drafts international treaties and decisions of the Commission
EURASIAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION 
（ representation level: professionals nominated by the member states; 
supervised by the Board） 
（permanently functioning regulator）
powers: 
•  runs activities towards enhanced integration across more than 20 
functional areas  
       Source: author, based on http://www.eaeunion.org/presentation/, accessed May 23, 2019.
 The EAEU has its own financial institutions. Established in January 
2006 with a registered capital of $7 bn, the Eurasian Development Bank19 
（EADB, based in Almaty）. The EADB plays the role of a financing mecha-
nism for the EAEU. In addition, in 2009 the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization 
19 Tajikistan is the only non-member of the EAEU, which is a party to the EADB.
124
Elena SHADRINA： Post-Soviet Integration: Case of Eurasian Economic Union
and Development （EFSD） （formerly, EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund） with a 
registered capital of $8.513 bn, was established and is managed by the EADB.
 The EAEU portrays itself as a platform for implementing the fun-
damental shifts in the architectures of Europe and Eurasia, from Lisbon to 
Jakarta （Yeliseyeu 2019）, by structuring its relations with the EU, ASEAN 
and China, including a vast host of prospects opening under the latter’s BRI. 
In 2016, the EAEU concluded its first FTA with Vietnam, and in 2019 
with Singapore and Serbia. A provisional FTA with Iran was concluded 
in May 2018, which became effective in October 2019. Also, in May 2018, 
the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EAEU 
and China was signed, which is perceived as the first step towards striking 
a full-fledged FTA. Besides, various kinds of cooperative schemes are being 
negotiated with India, Israel and Egypt （Table 7）. Currently, the potential 
for deeper economic cooperation with ASEAN, MERCOSUR, Andean 
Community, Greece, Morocco, Jordan, Mongolia, South Korea, New Zealand, 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand is assessed. The vision of Greater Eurasian 
Partnership with the EAEU’s leading role and involving member-states of 
the EU, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation （SCO)20 and ASEAN is being 
increasingly popularised by the EAEU member-states’ officials as a rational 
linkage with China’s BRI.21 The EAEU and China stated their desire to “create 
the conditions for the development of mutual trade relations” and the “pro-
motion of economic relations.” The EAEU and China are also “[r]ecognising 
the importance of conjunction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt 
and Road initiative as a means of establishing strong and stable trade relations 
in the region.”22 
20  After India and Pakistan joined the SCO in 2017, the number of its members reached eight. 
21  See recent publications by the Valdai Discussion Club, available at http://ru.valdaiclub.com, accessed 
27 February 2017.
22  Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation Between the Eurasian Economic Union and its 





pdf, accessed June 20, 2019. 
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Discussion and Conclusions  
 Returning to our initial enquiry about the nature of the EAEU’s in-
tegration, the tenets of Eurasianism can be traced back to the nineteenth 
century. Russia’s geographic location, historical and cultural interconnections 
with the neighbouring countries make the concept of Eurasian economic 
integration nothing but a rational and well-grounded vision. By the spirit of 
its founding documents, the EAEU is an economic integration. Its objectives 
emphasise the importance of improved living standards, free markets and 
enhanced competitiveness. Moreover, the father of the idea of the Eurasian 
Union the former president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev23 articu-
lated specifically that the EAEU is an economic and not a political union. 
Nazarbayev elaborated that Kazakhstan （like any other member-state）, ac-
cording to the EAEU’s Treaty, is free to leave the Union and it will do so 
if there is any threat to Kazakhstan’s independence. A frequently repeated 
argument that Russia has real channels to determine the decision-making 
process in the EAEU clashes with reality. Whereas the member-states as-
sume that owing to the differences in the scale of economies, Russia stands to 
draw larger benefits from deeper integration, it is exactly the opposite: Russia’s 
initiatives tend to be taken warily, put through more profound scrutiny and 
oftentimes rejected （Libman 2018）. 
 The EAEU is an integration of diverse economies in terms of their scale, 
resource endowment, structure, among others. This, however, is a common 
fact for economic integrations. Despite all the EAEU economies have diversi-
fied their economic ties throughout the years of independence, they all can 
still be characterised as having preserved strong connections with the Russian 
economy and this was a factor supporting the initial integration. What is often 
being discussed is a challenge for smaller economies in their endeavour to ob-
tain some benefits from integration. The results of statistical analysis presented 
in a related work （Shadrina 2020） demonstrate that smaller EAEU economies 
have so far been successful in establishing more diversified ties with the EAEU 
23  Kazakhstan may leave the EEU if its interests are infringed: Nazarbayev, https://en.tengrinews.kz/
politics_sub/Kazakhstan-may-leave-EEU-if-its-interests-are-infringed-255722/, accessed June 30, 
2019.
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nations. While it is indisputable that Russia dominates in all intra-EAEU eco-
nomic transactions simply because the scale of Russian economy remains large 
in comparison with the other EAEU economies, it shall be noted that Russia’s 
engagement with the EAEU economies also gradually increases.
 The EAEU’s formation has been an organic growth process with three 
actors steadily interested in taking it further and deeper. The EAEU has been 
evolving despite being largely （mis）interpreted as the antithesis of the EU. 
The post-Soviet economies were confronting themselves with unnecessary 
ultimatums. A somehow evolved formula that integration with the EAEU 
cancels out the prospects of integration with the EU inflicted dramatic turns 
in the post-Soviet economic history. Having progressed with the institution-
alisation of their integration initiative, the EAEU member-states moved from 
cooperation to integration: from “lessening discrimination” to “suppression of 
some forms of discrimination” （Balassa 1961: 2）. As the EAEU has become 
an international entity endowed with its own legal personality, the interna-
tional actors have started engaging with the EAEU on an inter-regional basis 
rather than with individual member states. The EAEU activated its interna-
tional legal authority by probing wider cooperation through trade agreements 
with Vietnam, Singapore, Serbia and China. The EAEU created supranational 
institutions for the macroeconomic and sectoral policymaking and the imple-
mentation of integration initiatives. As the goals and objectives of the EAEU 
declare the importance of enhanced economic welfare of the member-states, 
the EEC broadened the range of areas to see an enhanced integration. This 
includes harmonisation of digitalisation of the economies, integration of phar-
maceutical markets, the unification of standards and processes, and many more 
besides conventional liberalisation of trade, investment, and labour migration.  
 With all the differences in place between the national political sys-
tems and processes, there are important complementarities （Kobayashi 2017, 
2019）. The characteristics of the EAEU member-states （non-democratic） 
political systems are oftentimes pointed to as the setbacks to the authentic 
economic integration （Yeliseyeu 2019）. Yet, the fact that the systems are co-
hesive for the similarity of their principal parameters is critical for the integra-
tion to incept and unfold. At the level of business elites, there seems to be an 
essential cohesiveness as well, because the EAEU economies are dominated by 
state-owned companies or businesses loyal to the national political elites. The 
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EAEU economies’ institutional cohesiveness and complementarity are one of 
the factors spurring Eurasian integration （Shadrina 2018, 2019）. Economic 
integration often results in the overlaps of interests, which complicates the 
negotiation and results in the delays of the integration initiatives’ implementa-
tion. The EAEU also has such experience having spent considerable time and 
investing efforts in negotiations over transition periods, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, among others. The negotiations before the accession have taken place 
with Russia’s various offerings to the potential candidates as a means of their 
persuasion in the attractiveness of the EAEU’s membership. For Kyrgyzstan, 
a US$1 bn Russian-Kyrgyz development fund and the writing off of a US$0.3 
bn of debt were part of the accession deal. Armenia was given a 30 % discount 
on Russian gas. Besides, Russia’s continued military and political support of 
Armenia in its complicated relations with the neighbouring Azerbaijan and 
Turkey was also factored in. Belarus, as is known, relies heavily on subsidised 
Russian oil and gas （which is assessed as being equivalent to about ¼ of the 
country’s GDP）, as well as receives substantial loans, such as the 2016 US$2 
bn loan from the EDB. A favourable aspect for the negotiation and decision-
making processes is that the five still member-states rely on the Russian 
language as the lingua franca, albeit the future of this is not guaranteed. A 
growing number of young generation population in the EAEU members do 
not choose to study Russian as a foreign language. Also, Kazakhstan’s plan to 
complete transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet by 2025 is likely to 
weaken the familiarity with the Russian language in the country. 
 Weighing economic integration in the EAEU “...as a process” or “as a 
state of affairs” （Balassa 1961: 1）, it is accurate to characterise the EAEU as 
a process. The EAEU has accomplished various measures designed to abolish 
discrimination among the EAEU economies, and it is yet to expand integra-
tion at higher levels through, for example, monetary and transport policies, 
and deepen integration across the sectors, unifying, for instance, the financial 
and energy markets. 
 The example of the EU remains the best integration project so far mas-
tered by humankind. The EU has a rich history of its own bitter lessons and 
inspiring accomplishments. It, therefore, cannot be anything other than the 
two ̶ the EU and the EAEU ̶ interacting harmoniously. Currently, the es-
tablishment of formal ties with the EAEU is problematic over the geopolitical 
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and geoeconomic reasons （Kazantsev 2015, Molchanov 2015, Dutkiewicz & 
Sakwa 2015, Lane and Samokhvalov 2015）, although scholars of the post-
Soviet integration admit that the EU is a natural partner for the EAEU 
（Pastukhova and Westphal 2015, Gusev and Westphal 2016, Nitoiu 2017）. 
A feeble ray of hope in such an unfavourable context is that since 2017 the 
Erasmus+ Programme of the EU runs the project “Simulating EU-Eurasian 
Economic Union Negotiations to Encourage Transnational Active Learning 
and Civil Dialogue” at the St.-Petersburg State University. In 2019, the main 
goal of the Simulation Game, as eccentric as it may sound, was to work out a 
basic agreement on a DCFTA between the EU and the EAEU.  
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